A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities

Łukasz Balbus, Paweł Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, Łukasz Woźny

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)497-523
Number of pages27
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - Apr 1 2019


  • Computation of equilibria
  • Distributional equilibria
  • Games with strategic complementarities
  • Large games
  • Non-aggregative games
  • Supermodular games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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