Abstract
We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-27 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Economic Theory |
| DOIs | |
| State | Accepted/In press - Sep 7 2017 |
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Keywords
- Computation of equilibria
- Distributional equilibria
- Games with strategic complementarities
- Large games
- Non-aggregative games
- Supermodular games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities. / Balbus, Łukasz; Dziewulski, Paweł; Reffett, Kevin; Woźny, Łukasz.
In: Economic Theory, 07.09.2017, p. 1-27.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities
AU - Balbus, Łukasz
AU - Dziewulski, Paweł
AU - Reffett, Kevin
AU - Woźny, Łukasz
PY - 2017/9/7
Y1 - 2017/9/7
N2 - We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.
AB - We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.
KW - Computation of equilibria
KW - Distributional equilibria
KW - Games with strategic complementarities
KW - Large games
KW - Non-aggregative games
KW - Supermodular games
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85028996559&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85028996559&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00199-017-1075-7
DO - 10.1007/s00199-017-1075-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85028996559
SP - 1
EP - 27
JO - Economic Theory
JF - Economic Theory
SN - 0938-2259
ER -