@article{a0ee5ece03bc4fdb8748f55fce8e24ce,
title = "A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities",
abstract = "We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.",
keywords = "Computation of equilibria, Distributional equilibria, Games with strategic complementarities, Large games, Non-aggregative games, Supermodular games",
author = "{\L}ukasz Balbus and Pawe{\l} Dziewulski and Kevin Reffett and {\L}ukasz Wo{\'z}ny",
note = "Funding Information: We thank Rabah Amir, Bob Becker, Ed Green, Martin Kaae Jensen, Ali Khan, Bob Lucas, Alejandro Manelli, Ed Prescott, Xavier Vives, Jan Werner, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful discussions on various issues related to this paper. We also thank the Editor and two anonymous Referees of this journal for their comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. The Project was financed by NCN Grant No. UMO-2012/07/D/HS4/01393. Reffett thanks the Dean?s Award in Excellent Summer Grant Program for its generous support of this research. Funding Information: Acknowledgements We thank Rabah Amir, Bob Becker, Ed Green, Martin Kaae Jensen, Ali Khan, Bob Lucas, Alejandro Manelli, Ed Prescott, Xavier Vives, Jan Werner, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful discussions on various issues related to this paper. We also thank the Editor and two anonymous Referees of this journal for their comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. The Project was financed by NCN Grant No. UMO-2012/07/D/HS4/01393. Reffett thanks the Dean{\textquoteright}s Award in Excellent Summer Grant Program for its generous support of this research. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017, The Author(s).",
year = "2019",
month = apr,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-017-1075-7",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "67",
pages = "497--523",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "3",
}