A game-theoretic approach to quality control for collecting privacy-preserving data

Weina Wang, Lei Ying, Junshan Zhang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the design of an incentive mechanism for a principal, who is assumed to be not trustworthy, to collect informative data from privacy-sensitive individuals. The principal offers payments to incentivize participation and informative data reporting. The individuals are strategic and take into account both the payment and the cost for privacy loss during data reporting. Due to privacy concerns, an individual may be willing to report only a noisy version of the private data, resulting in quality degradation. To achieve desirable accuracy of data analysis, it is imperative for the principal to have an incentive mechanism under which the quality of the collected data is controllable. In this paper, we exploit a game-theoretic approach to the design of a payment mechanism, such that the quality of the collected data is controllable through a parameter ϵ by making sure that each individual's strategy in a Nash equilibrium is to participate and symmetrically randomize her data, while guaranteeing ϵ-differential privacy. With this design, the principal can achieve any given accuracy objective by using the payment mechanism associated with an appropriate ϵ. In contrast to most of the existing work, which considers trusted principal and thus focuses on designing truthful mechanisms, this work is the first one to consider untrustworthy principal in private data collection and quality control mechanisms in such a scenario. We also show that the total expected payment of the designed mechanism at equilibrium is asymptotically optimal in the high data quality regime.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages474-479
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781509018239
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 4 2016
Event53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015 - Monticello, United States
Duration: Sep 29 2015Oct 2 2015

Other

Other53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello
Period9/29/1510/2/15

Fingerprint

Data privacy
Quality control
Degradation
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Wang, W., Ying, L., & Zhang, J. (2016). A game-theoretic approach to quality control for collecting privacy-preserving data. In 2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015 (pp. 474-479). [7447042] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2015.7447042

A game-theoretic approach to quality control for collecting privacy-preserving data. / Wang, Weina; Ying, Lei; Zhang, Junshan.

2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 474-479 7447042.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Wang, W, Ying, L & Zhang, J 2016, A game-theoretic approach to quality control for collecting privacy-preserving data. in 2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015., 7447042, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 474-479, 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015, Monticello, United States, 9/29/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2015.7447042
Wang W, Ying L, Zhang J. A game-theoretic approach to quality control for collecting privacy-preserving data. In 2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 474-479. 7447042 https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2015.7447042
Wang, Weina ; Ying, Lei ; Zhang, Junshan. / A game-theoretic approach to quality control for collecting privacy-preserving data. 2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 474-479
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