A Cournot game analysis on market effects of queuing energy request as demand response

Chen Chen, Shalinee Kishore, Zhifang Wang, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Anna Scaglione

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A key way for the power grid to withstand increasing demand electricity and a more diverse and unpredictable mix of energy resources is to encourage demand side participation in the electricity market. Recent rulings by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) favor not only the inclusion of but also the compensation for Demand Response (DR) aggregators in the wholesale electricity market. In this paper, we study the market effects of including Green Energy Management System (GEMS), a future Demand Response (DR) program that will take advantage of operational flexibility of certain types of loads to shape demand profile. Compared to other more classical DR methods, GEMS use a new architecture that allows them to build reserves of load requests associated to specific end-uses, e.g., Electrical Vehicle charging. The load can be dispatched (by turning on appliances) to follow a desired profile, called load modification, when compared to the unscheduled load profile. To study the market effect of GEMS, we adopt a Cournot game model that is widely used to study the behavior of traditional generators in the wholesale electricity market. The players in the game include traditional generators, the GEMS, and the Independent System Operator (ISO). We determine the optimization approach that must be taken by the GEMS to maximize its profits. We also determine the market equilibrium conditions that must exist among the players. Our numerical results indicate that the GEMS' participation reduces the average market price of electricity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012 - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: Jul 22 2012Jul 26 2012

Other

Other2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period7/22/127/26/12

Fingerprint

Energy management systems
Electricity
Energy resources
Mathematical operators
Profitability
Power markets

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Nuclear Energy and Engineering
  • Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Chen, C., Kishore, S., Wang, Z., Alizadeh, M., & Scaglione, A. (2012). A Cournot game analysis on market effects of queuing energy request as demand response. In IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting [6345625] https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2012.6345625

A Cournot game analysis on market effects of queuing energy request as demand response. / Chen, Chen; Kishore, Shalinee; Wang, Zhifang; Alizadeh, Mahnoosh; Scaglione, Anna.

IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. 2012. 6345625.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Chen, C, Kishore, S, Wang, Z, Alizadeh, M & Scaglione, A 2012, A Cournot game analysis on market effects of queuing energy request as demand response. in IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting., 6345625, 2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012, San Diego, CA, United States, 7/22/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2012.6345625
Chen C, Kishore S, Wang Z, Alizadeh M, Scaglione A. A Cournot game analysis on market effects of queuing energy request as demand response. In IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. 2012. 6345625 https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2012.6345625
Chen, Chen ; Kishore, Shalinee ; Wang, Zhifang ; Alizadeh, Mahnoosh ; Scaglione, Anna. / A Cournot game analysis on market effects of queuing energy request as demand response. IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. 2012.
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