Abstract
This paper explores a multi-player game of optimal stopping over a finite time horizon. A player wins by retaining a higher value than her competitors do, from a series of independent draws. In our game, a cutoff strategy is optimal, we derive its form, and we show that there is a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in symmetric cutoff strategies. We establish results concerning the cutoff value in its limit and expose techniques, in particular, use of the Budan-Fourier Theorem, that may be useful in other similar problems.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 2016-0128 |
Journal | B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics |
Volume | 18 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Algebraic geometry
- Game theory
- Optimal stopping
- Polynomial sequences
- Search
- Secretary problem
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)